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‘I believe the target of anything in life should be to do it so well that it becomes an 





























Today it is accepted that states may not unilaterally attack each other using rifles, 
missiles, nuclear, or chemical weapons. But what about computer software such as 
worms and trojans which are capable of causing similar or greater damage? Are 
states permitted to attack each other using these so-called cyberweapons? Are they 
even considered weapons due to their differing form? This is the crux of what this 
dissertation is about. It aims to show that if states are prohibited from attacking each 
other with certain categories of weapons, they should not be permitted to attack each 
other with a different weapon which causes similar damage. I make three 
overarching arguments in this dissertation. The first is that cyberweapons should be 
considered ‘weapons’ even though they differ in form and sophistication. Secondly, 
that the use of cyberattacks is a use of force and contravenes article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. Finally, I will argue that extant international law is not able to maintain 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In February 2019, reports emerged in various media outlets that Russia was planning 
on shutting down the internet within the country temporarily in order to simulate an 
all-out cyberwar.1 These reports suggest that the shutdown appears to be a test by the 
Kremlin in preparation to wean Russia off foreign internet service providers and 
make Russia digitally independent in a bid to protect the country against 
cyberattacks.2 These developments appear to be in line with the cyber defence policy 
which the Russian government has been working on for numerous years,3 with some 
Russian officials saying that Russia aims to have 95% of all internet traffic routed 
locally by 2020.4 
To the layperson, Russia’s decision to remove and insulate itself from the internet 
may be seen as drastic, but upon closer inspection, Russia’s actions may be viewed 
as pre-empting the latest threat to international peace and security: cyberattacks. 
The advancement of technology has impacted all aspects of life. Conflict and 
weaponry are no different. Cyberspace is increasingly becoming the battleground 
where states and non-state actors look to engage in conflict, and this is supported by 
William Boothby who said: 
The rifle, the bayonet, mortars, bombs, missiles, and mines will remain 
critically important tools in the conduct of hostilities in many future, 
conventional armed conflicts… But cyberspace will… become the 
environment in which adversaries employ some degree of operational 
sophistication and will seek to gain and maintain military advantage by 
leveraging their own hostile activities while impeding the enemy’s capability 
to organize and operate.5 
 
1 Alex Kimani ‘Why is Russia turning off its internet?’ Safehaven Preservation of Capital 16 February 
2019 available at https://safehaven.com/news/Breaking-News/Why-Is-Russia-Turning-Off-Its-
Internet.html accessed 16 May 2019. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Harry Pettit ‘Cyberwars Russia to test to test turning the entire internet OFF to defend against US 
cyberattack’ The Sun 11 February 2019 available at https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/8401797/russia-
vs-us-cyber-war-games/ accessed 16 May 2019. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Claire Oakes Finkelstein and Kevin H. Govern ‘Introduction: Cyber and the Changing Face of War’ 





Cyberattacks are no longer a hypothetical possibility. Cyberattacks are a reality. 
Furthermore, cyberattacks are no longer limited to gathering sensitive information 
from one’s adversaries but are now used to cause physical damage to one’s enemies. 
There are plenty of examples of states and non-state actors who have conducted 
cyberattacks which caused physical damage, the most prominent being ‘Operation 
Olympic Games’ which was orchestrated by the United States and Israel against 
Iran.6 
This attack involved releasing a virus into the computer systems of the nuclear 
reactor at Natanz which was considered to be the central facility for uranium 
enrichment for Iran’s nuclear weapons.7 The virus wreaked havoc and caused 
damage to critical infrastructure, and other damage which was comparable to an 
attack using traditional weapons. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden summed up 
the importance of this attack when he said, ‘this is the first attack of a major nature in 
which a cyberattack was used to effect physical destruction.’8 He would later 
compare this transformation in warfare to that which occurred in 1945 after the 
development and use of the atomic bomb.9 This sentiment was echoed by former FBI 
Director Robert Muller who said that a cyberattack could have the ‘same impact as a 
well placed bomb.’10 
Unlike nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction which were only available to a 
relatively small number of states, cyberattacks can be employed by most states. In 
2007, security firm McAfee estimated that 120 states had developed ways to use the 
internet to target financial markets, government computer systems and utilities.11 Iran 
has previously boasted about having the world’s second largest cyber army.12 The 
 
6 Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern, and Claire Finkelstein Cyberwar: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts 




10 Reuters ‘FBI Director Robert Mueller warns of growing cyber threat, could affect gov’t, business, 
individuals’ 5 March 2010 NY Daily news available at 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/fbi-director-robert-mueller-warns-growing-cyber-
threat-affect-gov-business-individuals-article-1.174257 accessed on 16 May 2019. 






threat of cyberattacks and cyberwar is so great to the United States that the FBI 
considered them the number one threat to US national security.13  
The preceding paragraphs raise numerous questions. First, are the tools used to carry 
out cyberattacks (cyberweapons) considered weapons in the same way as traditional 
weaponry? Second, are the use of cyberattacks a use of force, and therefore a 
contravention of article 2(4) of the UN Charter? Finally, if cyberattacks are a use of 
force, is existing international law capable of adequately regulating interstate conflict 
in the new battleground of cyberspace? 
This dissertation will make three overarching arguments: the first is that 
cyberweapons are weaponry and should be regarded as weapons in the same way as 
traditional weapons. Second, that cyberattacks are a use of force. Finally, I will argue 
that existing international law is not able to adequately regulate the use of 
cyberattacks and that a multilateral treaty is required to maintain international peace 
and security. 
This dissertation will therefore be divided as follows: chapter two will argue that 
cyberweapons are weapons, and it will provide examples of states using them as 
such. The purpose of this chapter is two fold: first, it is to establish what a 
cyberweapon is as there is no international consensus on the meaning of both 
‘weapon’ and ‘cyberweapon’. Second, this chapter aims to show that states are using 
cyberweapons alongside, or as an alternative to traditional weapons.  This Chapter 
will also provide the reader with examples of the different types of cyberweapons. 
Finally, this chapter will provide numerous examples of states employing 
cyberattacks. 
Chapter three will argue that cyberattacks can constitute an armed attack, or what the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case14 termed the ‘most grave’ use of force.15 This will build on 
chapter two, which discusses the physical damage that can be caused by 
cyberattacks, and that such cyberattacks can cause damage of the scale and effects 
required to constitute an armed attack. 
 
13 RT ‘FBI: Cyber Attacks – America’s Top Terror Threat’ 2 March 2012 available at 
https://www.rt.com/news/cyber-fbi-security-mueller-691/ accessed on 31 March 2019. 
14 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) 
ICJ. 





Chapter four will argue that cyberattacks can also constitute a ‘less grave’ use of 
force. This chapter may initially seem redundant because a cyberattack which is an 
armed attack by extension satisfies the requirements to be a ‘less grave’ use of force. 
However, it is still worth investigating the status of cyberattacks which do not rise to 
the scale and effects to constitute an armed attack, and to investigate the non-violent 
cyberattacks and whether they too can constitute a use of force. 
Chapter five will argue that existing international law is not able adequately to deal 
with the unique nature of cyberattacks, and that a multilateral treaty is the best option 
to maintain international peace and security. In making this argument, this section 
will discuss the judicial and non-judicial responses currently available to the victim 
state of a cyberattack. This chapter will then discuss numerous ways in which a 
multilateral treaty would better address state conduct in cyberspace, thereby ensuring 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Chapter six will be the final chapter of this dissertation and will discuss the 


















CHAPTER TWO: CYBERWEAPONS AND CYBERATTACKS 
In this chapter, I plan to make the first of my three overarching arguments, which is 
to argue that cyberweapons are weapons. The aim of this chapter is to argue that the 
concept of a ‘weapon’ is not static, but is ever evolving and includes cyberweaponry. 
This chapter’s aim is to argue that despite differing in form and sophistication, 
cyberweapons form the latest development of the evolution of weaponry.  This is 
supported by the fact that states have added cyberweaponry to their arsenals and are 
using cyberweapons alongside, or in place of traditional weapons. This sentiment is 
echoed by international law expert, Professor Yoram Dinstein who said: 
Weapons (including munitions) are the means of warfare, and without 
weapons there can be no war. Weapons determine the way war is fought – on 
land, at (or under) the sea, and in the air – and frequently their outcome. 
History is replete with illustrations of weapons affecting civil life (for 
instance, the appearance and disappearance of walled cities) and the 
formation of empires (for example, the need of navies for coaling stations). 
Military history is a history of changing weapons. Mankind has come a long 
way from sling stones or bows and arrows to nuclear weapons, and the rapid 
pace at which novel weapon systems emerge in the modern era of computers 
and electronics is unprecedented.16 
Arguing that cyberweapons are weapons is complicated by the fact that there is no 
internationally accepted definition for both ‘weapon’ and ‘cyberweapon’.17 
Surprisingly, these terms are also not present in the latest version of the US 
Department of Defence’s Dictionary of Military Terms.18 
In arguing that cyberweapons are weapons, this chapter will be divided as follows: 
Section A will define and discuss cyberweapons. Section B will proceed to set out 
some of the types of cyberweapons which have been identified. Finally, Section C 
will provide examples of states using cyberweapons either alongside, or in place of 
traditional weaponry. 
 
16 William H. Boothby Weapons and the law of armed conflict 2 ed (2016) at vii. 
17 Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney ‘Cyber-weapons’ (2012) The Rusi Journal at 6. 
18 United States Department of Defence ‘DOD Dictionary of Military Terms’ (2018) available at 






SECTION A: CYBERWEAPONS 
One of the most surprising discoveries of this investigation has been the lack of an 
internationally accepted definition of what a weapon is. This is because of mankind’s 
prolonged use of weaponry and because so many international conventions ban or 
regulate the use of certain weapons. 
Moving forward, this dissertation will rely on the following definition when 
discussing traditional weapons: a weapon is a tool that is used, or designed to be 
used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional or mental harm to 
structures, systems, or living things.19 This definition is deemed satisfactory because 
it covers tools that are intuitively understood to be weapons such as rifles and other 
firearms, but it is also able to cover tools which were not created to be weapons but 
which have been repurposed with the intention of being used as weapons, such as a 
knife or a hammer. 
Cyberweapons differ too much in form and sophistication from traditional weapons 
to completely fall under the above definition. Instead, Rid and McBurney provide the 
following definition of a cyberweapon: ‘a cyberweapon is seen as a subset of 
weapons more generally: as a computer code that is used, or designed to be used, 
with the aim of causing physical, functional or mental harm to structures, systems or 
living beings.’20  
This definition (malicious software + intention) is supported by other authors such as 
Louise Arimatsu who defines a cyberweapon as ‘malicious code with offensive 
capabilities.’21 She continues to say that it is ‘both the intended outcome or effects 
produced by that code that transforms it into a weapon that should be governed, as 
with conventional weapons, by the law of armed conflict.’22    
Cyberweapons differ from traditional weapons in that traditional weapons are 
intended to cause direct physical damage which would lead to the death or injury of 
persons and the destruction of property. Cyberweapons on the other hand are 
intended to have an indirect outcome which may then result in death, injury or 
 
19 Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney Op Cit note 17 at 7. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Louise Arimatsu ‘A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and Practical 






destruction of property. Although cyberweapons are intended to cause an indirect 
outcome, the devastation can be similar or greater than that which traditional 
weapons could cause. The worst case scenarios that have been envisaged would be 
overriding the controls at a nuclear or chemical powerplant which would cause a 
chemical release or nuclear meltdown killing thousands, if not millions of people.23  
The next section will discuss some identified cyberweapons. 
SECTION B: TYPES OF CYBERWEAPONS 
This section aims to discuss three types of cyberweapons: viruses and worms; trojans 
and rootkits; and botnets. This list does not represent all cyberweapons, but merely 
the most widely known and utilized. 
(a) Viruses and Worms 
In the same way that biological viruses attach themselves to larger organisms and 
feed off them, a computer virus infects a program or file, abuses it to spread itself, 
and inflicts damage ranging from system malfunction, system shutdowns, data 
corruption and erasing.24  
Worms are stand-alone viruses that are not attached to any files.25 They are small 
hidden programmes that remain inactive until certain conditions are met, or when 
they have been remotely activated.26 They self-replicate and exploit software flaws 
and other weaknesses in emails, unattended ports or buffer overflows.27 
(b) Backdoors: Trojans and Rootkits 
This software, which was named after the infamous Trojan horse, is a program that 
either poses as a legitimate free software, or hides in a legitimate looking file.28 The 
user is then enticed into installing the programme and is lured into opening a file 
containing a Trojan. Once installed, the Trojan secretly performs its tasks, which 
include but are not limited to, capturing data such as login credentials, credit card 
 
23 Council on Foreign Relations ‘Cyberterrorism Hype v. Fact’ available at https://www.cfr.org/expert-
brief/cyberterrorism-hype-v-fact accessed on 12 August 2019. 
24 Georg Kerschischnig Cyberthreats and international law (2012) at 31. 
25 Ibid. 







information, and trade, military and state secrets.29 Trojans usually open a ‘backdoor’ 
to the infected system so that the perpetrator can update and revise it to avoid 
security programmes designed to detect and remove them.30  
A ‘rootkit’ refers to a special kind of Trojan that may be installed by a hacker who 
has gained access to a computer system.31 Like a Trojan mentioned above, it creates 
a backdoor and remains hidden to the user by staying invisible in the list of processes 
and services.32 It gives the hacker access to the compromised system and then awaits 
further instructions from the hacker, such as downloading additional malware.33 
(c) Botnets 
Bots, which derive from ‘robots’, are a special kind of Trojan which take control of a 
small number of the infected system’s resources and allocate them to their ‘master’ 
who controls a network of infected systems.34 The affected computers become so-
called ‘zombies’ and the abovementioned master controls all of his zombies in a 
botnet.35 A botnet therefore can be understood as a network of bots.  
Botnets are able to take instructions from any infected computer and can infect 
computers in a number of ways, but mainly through always-on broadband 
connections.36 A newer trend does not even require that the computers be switched 
on in order to be infected and for the perpetrator to assume control. Here, the 
perpetrator assumes control over modems, routers, and satellite TV receivers.37 What 
makes this an attractive method is that in private homes, these devices are more 
likely to be switched on all the time and remain connected to the internet for much 
longer periods.38  
Botnets have a variety of capabilities. They can be used to spy on infected machines 
and collect personal information, to create backdoors to gain further access to a 
















into other systems (thus covering their tracks), or to launch Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks.39 DDoS attacks are generally launched against servers, and 
not a single computer. When an attack hits a server, it receives more requests than it 
can handle, leading to delays or to the server’s complete incapacity until the requests 
start to decrease. Their aim is to temporarily affect the availability of a system or 
network and they can be used to stall or take down the targeted system, prevent 
communication and cause a network and even parts of the internet to slow down.40 A 
practical example of this was during the cyberattacks on Estonia, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Botnets entangle thousands of computers and have gained popularity recently, and 
their popularity is a cause for concern as they can easily infect a system while 
browsing legitimate but infected sites.41 In 2009, the Georgia Tech Information 
Security Centre estimated that these bots affected 15% of all computers online. This 
means that hypothetically speaking, there existed a bot army that could have been 
used in a cyberwar.42 
Their efficiency is also a cause for concern for security experts. A research group 
managed to get  temporary access to a botnet, and in 10 days they were able to 
collect 70GB off data which, when extracted, gave them access to the credentials of 
8310 financial accounts, 1660 credit and debit card numbers, and 297,962 user 
credentials.43 This concern is further exacerbated by the recent trend of renting out 
botnets and associated services, and it appears that botnets seem to be becoming 
more resilient against efforts to take them down.44 
SECTION C: EXAMPLES OF CYBERATTACKS 
The main reason that I argue that cyberweapons are to be considered weapons like 
traditional weapons is because they are considered so and are used as such. Evidence 
of the militarization of cyberspace is best articulated by retired US Air Force General 
and the Former Director of the National Security Agency, Michael Hayden who said: 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 35.  








Like everyone else who is or has been in a US Military uniform, I think of 
cyber as a domain. It is now enshrined in doctrine: land, sea, air space, cyber. 
It trips off the tongue, and frankly, I have found the concept liberating when I 
think about operationalizing this domain.45 
Former US President Barack Obama also famously referred to cyberweapons as 
“weapons of mass disruption” in a speech in 2009.46 The rest of this section will 
discuss various examples where states used cyberweapons either alongside, or as an 
alternative to traditional weapons.  
(a) Siberia, 1982 
On 21 September 1982, a three kiloton explosion tore apart a natural gas pipeline in 
Siberia. The explosion was so large that it was visible from outer space and is 
considered the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from 
space.47 Despite suspicions that the perpetrator was the US, the lack of proof linking 
them to the act meant that it could only remain speculation.  
In 2004, it was revealed that the attack was instigated by the CIA,48 when former 
Senior NSA official Thomas Reed revealed in his book that the US allowed the 
USSR to steal pipeline control software which contained a Trojan that caused an 
explosion in the Trans-Siberian pipeline.49 The Trojan did so by making the valves, 
pumps and turbines act erratically and produce pressures far beyond those acceptable 
to pipeline joints and welds.50 
 
 
45 Martin C. Libicki ‘Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain’ (2012) I/S: A Journal of law and Policy 
for the Information Society available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8efa/452e76f1666ab4efd2f10276078a430486f1.pdf at 321.  
46 Politico ’Weapons of Mass Disruption’ (2009) available at 
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/05/weapons-of-mass-disruption-023099 accessed 12 August 
2019. 
47David E. Hoffman ‘Reagan Approved Plan to Sabotage Soviets’ The Washington Post 27 February 
2004, available at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/02/27/reagan-
approved-plan-to-sabotage-soviets/a9184eff-47fd-402e-beb2-63970851e130/?noredirect=on 
accessed on 12 August 2019. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Risi ‘CIA Trojan Causes Siberian Gas Pipeline Explosion’ available at 
https://www.risidata.com/index.php?/Database/Detail/cia-trojan-causes-siberian-gas-pipeline-






(b)  Estonia, 2007 
In 2007, Estonia was a victim of a cyberattack the likes of which had never been seen 
before. Its effects were compounded by the fact that Estonia at that time, had the 
reputation of being the most connected country in Europe.51 The importance of this 
attack was described by Wired magazine as follows: 
This was not the first botnet strike ever, nor was it the largest. But never 
before had an entire country been targeted on almost every digital front all at 
once, and never before had a government itself fought back. The attacks were 
aimed at the essential electronic infrastructure of the Republic of Estonia 
[…]. All major commercial bank, telecos [telecommunication providers], 
media outlets and name servers – the phone book of the internet – felt the 
impact, and this affected the majority of the Estonian population. This was 
the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire 
nation.52 
In this attack, which occurred after the relocation of a Soviet war memorial, botnets 
commanded computers all over the world to attack Estonian websites with bogus 
traffic,53 while hackers targeted banks, governmental services, media providers, and 
even the national emergency call numbers.54 The Defence Minister even said ‘people 
felt that there was a real threat to national security.’55  
Estonian officials openly accused the Russian government from the outset of the 
attacks. However, no direct involvement of the Russian government was ever 
established.56 Only one person, an Estonian student of Russian heritage was 
convicted for participating in the attacks57 
(c)  South Ossetia War, 2008 
The summer of 2008 was characterized by tensions between Georgia and Russia 
concerning South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This conflict is significant because it is the 
 
51 Georg Kerschischnig Op Cit note 24 at 61. 
52 Ibid. 









first time that cyberattacks had not only preceded a conventional war for 
approximately two months, but intensified and ran parallel with it and even 
continued after the war was over.58 It was also the first time in which a ground attack 
coincided with a cyberattack.59 
The damages to Georgia were not as severe as Estonia because it was not as 
developed in terms of the internet. Therefore, the damage Georgia suffered was 
mainly to the disruption of governmental communication channels, media outlets, 
banks and transportation providers.60  Georgian hackers retaliated by attacking 
Russian news outlets and the South Ossertian government, however, they were 
‘outgunned’ by their opponents.61 
(d)  Iran, 2010 
The cyberattack on Iran in 2010 was briefly discussed in the first chapter. However, 
the first chapter discussed the effects of the cyberattacks, while this section aims to 
discuss the technological aspects of the cyberweapon which were omitted in the first 
chapter. 
This attack gained infamy for the use of the ‘Stuxnet’ worm, which specifically 
targeted critical infrastructure.62 Stuxnet is a highly infectious self-replicating 
computer worm that disrupted the Iranian nuclear plant.63 It took control of the 
computers, altered the speed of the centrifuges in the plant and shut them down.64  
Stuxnet hid on USB flash drives and installed upon attachment to the computer 
where it was able to exploit four zero-day vulnerabilities (a software security flaw 
known to the vendor, but the software vendor doesn’t have a patch to fix the flaw)65 
which was highly unusual.66 It continued to surprise cybersecurity specialists as it 
was discovered that this worm had the ability to make modifications in systems and 
 
58 Ibid at 63. 
59 Jonathan A. Ophardt ‘Cyber warfare and the crime of aggression: the need for individual 
accountability on tomorrow’s battlefield’ (2010) Duke Law & Technological review no 3 at 2.  
60 Georg Kerschischnig Op Cit note 24 at 63. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid at 69. 
63 Norton ‘Zero-day Vulnerability: What is it, and How it Works’ available at 
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-how-do-zero-day-vulnerabilities-work-
30sectech.html accessed 3 August 2019. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 





that its exact capabilities remained unknown, although experts speculate that it could 
have led to serious physical effects.67 
Stuxnet was also designed to target only industrial systems provided by Siemens, and 
only if certain conditions were met such as geographic location.68 This meant that it 
was designed to target systems which specifically controlled oil pipelines, electric 
plants, nuclear facilities and other large industrial installations.69 Investigations 
revealed that Stuxnet neutralized with the frequencies of enrichment centrifuges 
which could cause them to malfunction, or even destroy them.70  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to argue that cyberweapons are weapons. Despite being different 
in form and sophistication from traditional weapons, I submit that they are to be 
viewed as the latest development on the weapons spectrum as opposed to being a 
different entity. 
This argument is supported by other authors who have written on the matter who 
submit that a cyberweapon is malicious software which is intended to cause harm. It 
is also supported by state practice. This chapter has provided several examples of 
states utilizing cyberweaponry either alongside traditional weapons, or as alternatives 
to traditional weapons. Although they differed in form, cyberweapons were able to 
cause damage comparable to traditional weapons with the benefit of the perpetrator 
not needing to be in (relatively) close proximity to launch the attack.  
I submit that this chapter achieved its primary purpose which was to support the first 
of my overarching arguments that cyberweapons are weapons. By achieving its 
primary objective, this chapter has also created the perfect segue for the second of 













CHAPTER THREE: ARE CYBERATTACKS AN ARMED ATTACK? 
As a result of the Second World War and numerous attempts before that to limit war 
between states, Allied Powers drafted and adopted the UN Charter, containing an all-
encompassing prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4). Although it has been 
over 70 years since the Charter was adopted, the term ‘force’ is still surrounded by 
ambiguity. However, the majority of commentators consider the term ‘force’ in 
article 2(4) of the Charter as being synonymous with ‘armed’ or ‘military’ force.71 
This interpretation of force might have been sufficient in the aftermath of the Second 
World War as armed or military force was the only way in which states engaged in 
conflict. But technological advancements since the end of the Second World War 
have led to the emergence of a new domain where states can engage in conflict, 
cyberspace. The emergence of this new domain and its use by states to attack one 
another raises an important legal question: are cyberattacks a use of force according 
to article 2(4) of the UN Charter? 
Intuitively, one would come to the conclusion that cyberattacks are a use of force for 
numerous reasons. First, article 2(4) is the primary norm entrusted to safeguard 
international peace and security,72 and by becoming parties of the Charter, states 
accept a treaty law obligation to refrain from the threat or the use of force. Secondly, 
this provision – along with the overall aim of the Charter – aims to prevent interstate 
conflict and maintain international peace and security. Thirdly, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, cyberattacks are now no longer limited to hacking and other such 
intrusions, but are capable of causing physical damage similar to that caused by 
traditional weapons. Finally, I submit that the Charter would not be able to achieve 
its goal of maintaining international peace and security and ‘saving succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’ if it allowed for the use of cyberattacks by 
states. I submit that this would eventually provoke military force and ultimately lead 
to the outbreak of an international armed conflict. 
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Ascertaining whether cyberattacks are a use of force poses numerous challenges. The 
first is that there is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use of force 
both in and out of cyberspace.73 Secondly, although an argument can be made that 
cyberattacks can be an armed attack based on its scale and effects, the real difficulty 
arises in classifying cyberattacks whose damage does not rise to the threshold of an 
armed attack, or cyberattacks which do not cause death, injury or destruction (non-
violent cyberattacks).  
Some legal experts have suggested that in order to qualify as a use of force, 
cyberattacks must have ‘violent consequences.’74 A significant problem with this 
view is that in a world of heavy economic, political, military and social reliance on 
the internet, the consequences of the non-violent cyberattacks could exceed the 
‘violent’ ones.75 humankind’s ever-increasing reliance on the internet is exemplified 
by the fact that the 15 years between 1995 and 2010 saw the number of individuals 
who used the internet rise from 16 million to over 1.7 billion people.76 Today, states, 
non-state communities, businesses, academia and individuals have become 
interconnected and interdependent in ways never imagined.77 A consequence of this 
is that there are exponentially more potential ‘targets’ of a cyberattack, and the 
interconnectivity between people means that the collateral damage of a cyberattack 
could be catastrophic. 
Based on the reasons listed above and those I will discuss below, the next two 
chapters will argue that cyberattacks are a use of force according to article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. This chapter will focus on whether cyberattacks can amount to an armed 
attack or what the ICJ has termed the ‘most grave’ use of force. Chapter four will 
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SECTION A: CAN CYBERATTACKS BE ARMED ATTACKS? 
Having established in the previous chapter that attacks employed with cyberweapons 
(cyberattacks) can cause damage which is similar to, or in some cases greater than 
that caused by traditional weapons, the question which needs to be answered is what 
options are available to a state which is the victim of a cyberattack? Are victim states 
left with little option but to endure and tolerate cyberattacks against them, or can they 
use force in self defence? 
In 2011, the US warned that it would retaliate with military force if it considered a 
cyberattack to be devastating enough.78 In the UN Charter era, to legally adopt this 
position they would need to rely on article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises 
states’ inherent right to individual and collective self defence. But this provision 
limits self defence to a state which has suffered an armed attack. 
This section will argue that a cyberattack is capable of being an armed attack. 
Although cyberattacks are employed by both state and non-state actors, this chapter 
will only focus on cyberattacks between states, or those that can be attributed to a 
state. Cyberattacks by non-state actors such as terrorists, whose actions cannot be 
attributed to a state are beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, this chapter 
will limit itself to whether a cyberattack can rise to an armed attack and will not 
discuss the considerations when acting in self defence, which are discussed in the 
Caroline case.79 
The discussion below will be based on the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare80 (Hereafter, the Tallinn Manual or the Manual) in 
order to argue that cyberattacks can be armed attacks triggering the right of self 
defence. The Tallinn Manual was written after the cyberattacks in Estonia at the 
invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence. The Manual was written by 20 internationally renowned experts in order 
to ascertain how international law can apply to cyber operations and cyberwarfare. In 
addition to the experts, three organizations were represented by observers throughout 
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the drafting process. These organizations were NATO, which was represented by Ulf 
Häußler, the International Committee of the Red Cross which was represented by Dr. 
Cordula Droege and Dr. Jean-Francois Queguiner, and the United States Cyber 
Command which was represented by Colonel Gary D. Brown.81 In an attempt to add 
academic credibility to the Manual, the Manual was peer reviewed by 13 
international legal scholars prior to its publication.82 
(a) Cyberattacks as armed attacks 
Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for the unilateral use of force by states only 
when they have suffered an armed attack. This provision states that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace. 
The experts confirmed that article 2(4) does not specify the type of weapon to be 
used in a use of force, and therefore an armed attack. This was confirmed by the 
Legality of Nuclear Weapons83 case where the ICJ confirmed that the choice of 
weaponry was immaterial to whether an attack qualified as an armed attack.84 This 
seems to be consistent with state practice where it is universally accepted that 
chemical, biological and radiological attacks of the scale and effects sufficient to 
constitute armed attacks trigger the right to self defence, despite their non-kinetic 
nature.85 The experts submit that identical reasoning would apply to cyberattacks.86 
In order for a state to rely on self defence, that state would need to be a victim of an 
armed attack which presupposes a use of force in the sense of article 2(4).87 In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ noted that not every use of force amounted to an armed 
attack, and therefore a state was only entitled to invoke article 51 if it had suffered an 
armed attack.88 Secondly, the Court found it necessary to distinguish the ‘most 
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grave’ forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from ‘less grave 
forms’ such as a mere ‘frontier incident’ based on the ‘scale and effects’ of the force 
involved, however the Court provided no further guidelines.89  
It is unsettled as to how many deaths are required before a cyberattack can constitute 
an armed attack. However, Security Council Resolution 611 has shown that even the 
death of a single individual is sufficient to constitute an armed attack. This 
Resolution was adopted after Khalil al-Wazir, an affiliate of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization was assassinated by Israeli forces and the Security Council 
declared this to be an act of aggression committed against the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Tunisia.90 Additionally, the Security Council also referred to 
the attack as a ‘flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations’.91 That being 
said, the International group of experts agreed that some cases were clear and that a 
cyberattack that injures or kills people or damages property would satisfy the scale 
and effects doctrine as articulated in Nicaragua.92 
According to the experts, an armed attack must have a trans-border element, and this 
element is always met when one state employs a cyberattack against another state 
which reaches the level of an armed attack.93  
There was deliberation between the experts whether the notion of an armed attack, 
because of the word ‘armed’, necessarily required the use of a ‘weapon’. The 
majority took the view that it did not, and that the critical factor was whether the 
effects of the cyberattack were comparable to those that would have arisen from an 
attack using traditional weapons.94  
Another issue of importance is whether cumulative cyberattacks could rise to the 
threshold of an armed attack.95 According to the experts, the determining factor is 
whether the same perpetrating state (whether directly or indirectly) has carried out 
smaller cyberattacks that are related, and that when taken together, meet the 
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threshold.96 If there is convincing evidence of this, then the experts agreed that there 
are grounds for treating the attacks as a composite armed attack.97 This argument can 
find support in the Oil Platforms98 case where the Court seemed to suggest that 
cumulative attacks can amount to an armed attack.99 
A challenging issue regarding cyberattacks involves determining which adverse 
effects to consider when deciding whether a cyberattack qualifies as an armed attack. 
The group of experts agreed that all foreseeable consequences of the cyberattack 
qualify.100 An example would be a cyberattack targeting a water purification plant. 
According to the experts, sickness and death caused by the contaminated water are 
foreseeable and should therefore be taken into consideration when deciding whether 
a cyberattack is an armed attack.101 There was some division however, about whether 
the effects must have been intended. The majority of the experts took the view that 
intention was irrelevant and that only the scale and effects mattered.102 
It is also necessary to consider the perpetrator when determining whether a 
cyberattack is an armed attack. In Nicaragua  ̧the ICJ said that: 
An armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by 
regular forces across the international border, but also the sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which 
carry out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to 
amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or 
its substantial involvement therein.103  
Thus, if a group of private individuals under the direction of state A commit 
cyberattacks directed against state B, and the consequences of the attack reach the 
requisite scale and effects, state A will have committed an armed attack.104 The same 
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The exercise of self defence is subject to the existence of a reasonable determination 
that an armed attack has occurred as well as the identity of the attacker.106 The issue 
regarding the inability to identify the perpetrator of a cyberattack is one that has 
plagued the debates surrounding cyberattacks. However, it seems as though 
advancements in technology have allowed states to be able to identify the 
perpetrators of cyberattacks. This was the case in October 2018 where the UK and its 
allies exposed a cyber campaign by the GRU - the Russian military intelligence 
service - which launched cyberattacks targeting political institutions, businesses, 
media and sports institutions.107 These attacks attempted to undermine international 
sporting institution WADA, disrupt transport systems in Ukraine, destabilize 
democracies and target businesses. What was of importance here was the UK’s 
ability to attribute numerous attacks to Russia with ‘almost certainty’,108 meaning 
that perpetrators of cyberattacks may not be able to act with impunity in the future. 
(b)  Academic Response to the Tallinn Manual 
The Tallinn Manual sought to show that existing international laws were applicable 
to cyberwarfare, and it has been met with both praise and critique. Those who praise 
it find it to be a ‘useful compilation of rules with commentary reflecting the different 
views on some of the thorny issues raised by this new technology.’109 Even critics of 
the Tallinn Manual such as Dieter Fleck, suggest that the Manual’s greatest 
contribution to international humanitarian law is that it has proven that extant 
international humanitarian laws still apply to cyber warfare.110 
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The factors (discussed in the Manual) that victim states of cyberattacks should 
consider when making use of force assessments have also been included in books on 
the subject,111 which I submit denotes further acceptance among scholars. 
The most commonly identified criticism of The Manual can be summarized by the 
following quote by Nam Khoa Nguyen, ‘Despite not being the panacea for 
international law on cyber warfare, the Manual still provides a foundation to assess 
the legality of cyber warfare in international and non-international armed conflict.’112 
This is because despite the acknowledgment that the Manual does provide a solid 
foundation regarding the applicability of international law to cyber warfare, the most 
common critique is that the Manual does not answer all the questions inherent in 
cyber warfare.113 
Mary O’Connell for example, claimed that there still exists the potential for 
miscalculation in the interpreting of the jus ad bellum.114 Some of the other criticisms 
of the Tallinn Manual are: that it does not specify what constitutes a cyberweapon, 
nor does it attempt to make any definitive conclusions on them;115 that the 
composition of the ‘Experts’ which compiled the Manual reflected a geographic 
bias;116 the experts were unable to reach consensus on a number of issues;117118 that 
the Tallinn Manual referenced only the military manuals of Canada, Germany, the 
UK and the US;119 and that the Manual does not only ground its validity in legal 
sources, but also seeks to rely on the specific position and reputation of the experts in 
order to add credibility to the Manual.120 
I submit that these critiques are not fatal to the Tallinn Manual’s credibility and its 
use in this dissertation. This is because many of the omissions that attracted criticism 
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related to cyber warfare and its relationship to international humanitarian law,121 and 
not to the scope of this dissertation which is whether cyberattacks can be an armed 
attack or a use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Finally, the fact that Dr. 
Cordula Droege (who represented the ICRC during the drafting of the Manual) 
described the Manual as a ‘useful compilation of rules with commentary reflecting 
the different views on some of the thorny issues raised by this new technology’,122 
and the fact that the Manual was peer reviewed prior to publication serves to 
preserve its credibility.  
CONCLUSION 
The creation of the UN Charter ushered in an era whereby a state could only legally 
use force in self defence if that state was the victim of an armed attack. Building on 
the previous chapter which argued that cyberweapons were weapons and could cause 
damage similar to traditional weapons, this chapter aimed to prove that cyberattacks 
could constitute an armed attack. This chapter relied on the Tallinn Manual where 20 
international law experts concurred, basing their opinion on general principles of 
international law and ICJ decisions. 
According to the experts, international law does not specify, and therefore does not 
limit which weapons may be utilized for a use of force. Additionally, much emphasis 
was placed on the scale and effects of the cyberattack, a threshold which can be met 
with cyberweapons and cyberattacks. It is therefore evident that cyberattacks are 
capable of being armed attacks. 
Having established that cyberattacks can be an armed attack or ‘most grave’ use of 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ARE CYBERATTACKS A USE OF FORCE? 
Although the previous section found that cyberattacks could be an armed attacked 
(‘most grave’ form of the use of force) and therefore automatically satisfy the 
requirement to be a ‘less grave’ use of force, I do not think that this is where the 
investigation should conclude. This is because the majority of cyberattacks either do 
not rise to the scale and effects to constitute an armed attack or they are cyberattacks 
which have non-violent effects.  
Additionally, states are also actively curating their cyberattacks to fall below this 
threshold. An example of this is the United States which retaliated against Iran 
shooting its drone down with a cyberattack which was designed to stay ‘well below 
the threshold of war’.123 I submit that cyberattacks falling below this threshold, or 
cyberattacks with non-violent consequences are also capable of contravening article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.  
This chapter therefore has multiple objectives. The first is to argue that the 
prohibition of ‘force’ within article 2(4) of the Charter includes the use of 
cyberattacks. I will argue that the provision was intended to prohibit interstate 
conflict, and that the term ‘force’ was used in order to avoid the exploitation of any 
loopholes that were common prior to the Second World War. I submit that the term 
‘force’ is not to be interpreted narrowly, but to be interpreted broadly so as to include 
cyberattacks.  
Secondly, even if the reader does not accept my first argument for a broad 
interpretation of ‘force’ extending to include cyberattacks, I will argue that force is a 
term capable of evolving over time to include the use of cyberattacks. I will provide 
evidence that the concept has in fact evolved over time. 
My final argument in this chapter relates to the non-violent cyberattacks or those 
falling below the threshold of an armed attack. Due to the lack of state practice and 
ICJ jurisprudence on cyberattacks, this chapter will identify cyberattacks which are 
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‘less grave’ uses of force and factors victim states should consider when making use 
of force assessments.  
SECTION A: PRE-CHARTER ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE FORCE 
This section will argue that the prohibition of ‘force’ includes the use of 
cyberattacks. This section will discuss the pre-charter attempts to limit force, the 
drafting of article 2(4) and will interpret various provisions in the UN Charter in 
order to argue that the prohibition of ‘force’ includes the use of cyberattacks.  
Although the UN Charter prohibits force, there remains no treaty definition of what 
force entails. In such situations, reference is made to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which, despite coming into force after the UN 
Charter, is a codification of customary international law.124 This has been confirmed 
by the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case,125 
where the Court held that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflected 
customary international law and could be used to interpret treaties which came into 
force before the Vienna Convention.126 
Article 31 states that: 
(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of 
its object and purpose. 
Additionally, article 32 states that: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
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(a) Attempts to reduce force  
Historically, the use of force by states was allowed, provided it was for a just 
cause.127 War was justifiable, if that war was waged against the authority of a 
sovereign (the state), a prior wrong had been committed, and the belligerent intended 
to advance good and avoid evil.128 
The historic concept of war was best described by Francisco Suarez who described 
war in these terms: 
An external contest of arms which is incompatible with external peace is 
properly called war, when carried out between two sovereign princes or 
between two states. When however, it is a contest between a prince and his 
own state, or between citizens and their state, it is termed sedition. When it is 
between private individuals it is called a quarrel or duel. The difference 
between these various kinds of contests appears to be material rather than 
formal.129 
The position whereby war could only be waged for a just cause changed in the 19th 
century as this requirement was ignored by states and they took up arms freely to 
enforce their interests.130 This created uncertainty about the legality of warfare and 
sparked a debate as to when war could be considered to have begun, with the 
objective view asserting that a situation of war had been created by the mere fact of 
an armed conflict; while the subjective view held that an accompanying animus 
belligerendi was also necessary.131 This was settled, whereby intention was 
communicated by a declaration of war, however, these declarations were in practice 
no more than a formality.132 
From the above, one could say that a state of war existed when there had been a 
declaration of war, an act of force had been committed animo belligerendi under the 
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authority of a state, or a belligerent chose to regard an act as warlike.133 The 
establishment of the status of war had a positive effect because once war was 
established, the parties were governed by humanitarian laws.134 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 introduced the first attempts to 
restrict the recourse to war.135 Convention (I) aimed to resolve disputes through 
peaceful measures before states turned to war.136 Contracting parties were ‘animated 
by a strong desire to concert for the maintenance of the general peace’ and ‘resolved 
to second by their best efforts the friendly settlement of international disputes’.137 
Convention (III) related to the Opening of Hostilities, contracting parties agreed to 
not commence hostilities between them without previous and explicit warnings, in 
the form of either a declaration of war containing reasons for the commencement of 
hostilities, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.138 
Despite the abovementioned and other conventions, the outbreak of World War I 
could not be prevented. In the aftermath of the First World War, a popular opinion 
emerged which held that belligerents had accidently slipped into a state of war,139 
and that had there been a forum available to discuss grievances and 
misunderstandings, the War could have been avoided. This led to a renewed political 
commitment to restrict warfare with the establishment of the League of Nations in 
1919 which sought to ‘promote international co-operation and to achieve 
international peace and security by the acceptance not to resort to war’.140 Article 10 
of the Covenant seemed to prohibit force when it stated: 
The members of the league undertake to preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
members of the League. In the case of any such aggression or in case of 
threat of danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means 




135 Marc Weller The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (2015) at 466. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid at 467. 
139 Ibid. 





However, this provision was not a prohibition against force and the subsequent 
articles make it clear that article 10 is merely a duty to submit their disputes to 
consultation, arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of the League 
of Nations.141 Evidence of this can be found in article 12, which required states to 
submit their disputes to either arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the 
League Council, and they were to wait three months after the decision before 
resorting to war. This three month cooling-off period was intended to prevent states 
from resorting to war. 
In addition to the Covenant of the League of Nations, there were several other 
attempts made to prevent war. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes is considered as the first attempt at imposing compulsory 
dispute settlement. However, this Protocol failed to materialize.142 The Locarno 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee also attempted to regulate the use of force.143 Here, 
Belgium, Germany and France agreed that they would ‘in no case attack or invade 
each other’.144  
However, the most significant attempt outside the Covenant to regulate the use of 
force was the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris in 1928, whereby 63 states 
(virtually the entire international community at the time) declared that they would 
‘condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.’145 
Article 2 states that conflict should only be solved through pacific means. The Pact 
of Paris can be seen as the first widely accepted denunciation of war.146 
The League of Nations and the Pact of Paris were unable to prevent the outbreak of 
the Second World War, and the prohibitions on the use of force contained in the 
aforementioned agreements depended on how parties chose to interpret the term 
‘war’.147 Although the Pact of Paris specifically outlawed war, it did not outlaw force 
in general. States who wanted to shirk their treaty obligations interpreted the term 
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restrictively, or they would resort to war without formal declarations of war.148 
Examples of these evasive measures were provided by Japan who referred to their 
invasion of China as an ‘incident’, Italy’s annexation of Abyssinia was labelled an 
‘expedition’ by Mussolini, and Germany’s ‘Anschluss’ (joining) of Austria in 1938 
led to the outbreak of WWII.149 Other times, states such as Japan, Germany and Italy 
simply chose to withdraw from the League of Nations altogether.150 
The failure of the League did not deter allied states from pursuing an international 
system of collective security, and this ultimately led to the creation of the Charter of 
the United Nations. The UN Charter retained certain principles of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations such as aiming for collective security, but made no allowances 
for members to withdraw from the UN.151 Furthermore, the Charter made it clear that 
war would no longer be tolerated in its Preamble, and article 2(4) of the Charter 
contained an all-encompassing prohibition on the threat or use of force similar to 
article 10 of the League’s Covenant. Article 2(4) states that: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United 
Nations. 
By erasing ‘war’ or ‘aggression’ from article 2(4), the drafters of the Charter hoped 
to avoid the semantic controversies that plagued the League of Nations,152 and the 
Charter only permitted unilateral force in self defence under article 51. Below, I will 
discuss the drafting of article 2(4) and refer to the travaux preparatoires of the UN 
Charter in order to decipher what the drafters of the Charter sought to include and 
exclude in the prohibition in article 2(4). 
(b)  The drafting of article 2(4) 
At the San Francisco conference, there were several rounds of discussion regarding 
the formulation of what would become article 2(4) of the Charter, which sought to 
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prohibit the use of force in as absolute terms as possible.153 The allied powers wanted 
to make the independent use of armed force by any member of the UN unlawful, 
except in cases of self defence against aggression.154  
During the negotiations, there were calls for an expanded prohibition of force in 
order to include other types of force other than armed force.155 Brazil proposed 
prohibiting economic force, Ecuador proposed the prohibition of moral or physical 
force, and Iran demanded the inclusion of political force within the prohibition and 
wanted the provision to include the following:  
All the Members of the Organisation should refrain from intervening in their 
international relations, whether directly or indirectly, in the international 
affairs of the other States and from the threat or the use of force in any 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Organisation.156  
None of these proposals were adopted. 
A second point of discussion at the Conference was the insertion of the prohibition of 
aggression into article 2(4) which was proposed by Brazil.157 Brazil proposed that the 
following provision be added:  
All threats or acts of violence committed by any state to the detriment of any 
other state shall be considered as acts of aggression committed against all 
other members of the Organisation.158  
Similar provisions were proposed by Ecuador, Bolivia and New Zealand, with the 
latter proposing a provision which advocated for the collective undertaking against 
aggression, which said: ‘All members of the Organisation undertake collectively to 
resist every act of aggression against any member.’ 159 These proposals referring to 
aggression were opposed by China, the US and the UK as they felt that it would 
narrow the scope of article 2(4).160 According to these states, aggression would be 
better covered by the term ‘threat to peace’. Although New Zealand’s amendment 
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received 26 votes in favour and 18 against, it was unable to be adopted because it 
failed to receive the two-thirds majority required to form part of article 2(4).161 
A third point of discussion concerned the final part of the provision ‘or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.162 Several delegates 
were concerned that this could be interpreted in a way whereby states could decide 
on their own whether or not the use of force was prohibited.163 Costa Rica proposed 
that it be deleted in order to ensure that the prohibition of the use of force was 
absolute.164 Norway supported the omission and instead proposed an alternative text 
aimed at the explicit prohibition of the threat or use of force not authorised by the 
Security Council in order to achieve the objectives of the Organisation.165 Brazil also 
expressed concerns about the possibility of the last sentence being interpreted as 
authorising unilateral force by states, claiming that such action was in accordance 
with the objectives of the Organisation.166 It proposed an amendment which allowed 
for action ‘being taken according to the procedures established by the Organisation 
and in accordance with its decisions’.167  
All of these were opposed by the UK and the US on the basis that the wording had 
been carefully considered in order to preclude interference with the enforcement 
clauses of Chapter VII of the Charter. The US and the UK argued that the text of the 
draft was the ‘most intelligible, forceful and economical language’.168 The US 
Delegate confirmed that the intention of the authors of the original text was to state 
in the broadest terms, an absolute all-inclusive prohibition, and that ‘or in any other 
manner’ was designed to ensure that there would be ‘no loopholes’.169  
Finally, based on the proposals of numerous small states, the Conference resolved to 
add ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’ to article 
2(4) which was intended to be an extra and specific guarantee for smaller states.170 
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(c) Preliminary conclusions 
Briefly, what can be deduced from this section is that article 2(4) of the Charter was 
the culmination of numerous efforts by states to prohibit and prevent interstate 
conflict. 
The term ‘force’ was also not intended to have a singular fixed meaning, and this can 
be deduced from the fact that the inclusion of terms like ‘aggression’ in the 
prohibition were seen to narrow the scope of article 2(4), implying that the intention 
was for this provision to have a broader interpretation. Article 2(4) was not intended 
to include all types of force, as certain types of force were excluded from the 
prohibition. From this it can be deduced that outside of the excluded types of force, 
other types of force could form part of this prohibition. It is evident that the term 
‘force’ was not intended to have a narrow interpretation, but was adopted to prevent 
states from exploiting linguistic loopholes in the law.  
(d)  Evolution of the concept of force 
From the negotiating of article 2(4) and the history that preceded it, I submit that the 
prohibition was initially intended to apply to interstate military force, which was the 
type of force that was prevalent at the time. I further submit that based on the 
negotiations surrounding the drafting of the provision, article 2(4) was not intended 
to be interpreted narrowly to only include this kind of force. Article 2(4) was also not 
intended to be interpreted so broadly as to include all types of force, and evidence of 
this is the explicit exclusion of moral, physical, political and economic force. Finally, 
the ICJ in the Dispute Concerning Navigational and Related Rights171 created a 
presumption that generic terms were always in the process of developing meanings 
and that, consequently such a meaning is capable of evolving over a long period of 
time.172 I submit that ‘force’ is one such generic term that is capable of developing 
over a long period of time, and that it has evolved to include the use of cyberattacks. 
Below, I will provide numerous examples of the development of this concept to 
show that the term is not static, but is capable of evolution. 
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(d)(i) Concept of force 
The first development to be discussed is the concept of ‘force’. Although the UN 
Charter does not provide a definition of force, the concept was developed by the 
Nicaragua case which divided the concept of force into two categories: the ‘most 
grave’ use of force (those consisting of an armed attack)173 and ‘less grave’ uses of 
force such as a mere frontier incident carried out by regular armed forces.174  
(d)(ii) Where 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by Members in their 
international relations, thus excluding the use of force by members solely within 
their own state.175  
This was developed by UNGA Resolution 1514, which sought to give effect to the 
right of self determination and prohibited the use of force internally against 
liberation movements and ‘peoples’ asserting their right to self determination. This 
resolution stated that: 
All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against 
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully 
and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their 
national territory shall be respected. 
This was repeated in UNGA Resolution 2625 which said: 
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal 
rights and self determination of that right to self determination and 
freedom and independence. 
(d)(iii) Who 
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force by Members, which are states. I have 
submitted above that this referred to a state’s military forces.  
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The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations in 1970, along with the Nicaragua case in 1986 developed the concept to 
show that force could be used by non-state actors such as irregular forces, armed 
band or mercenaries. 
The resolution, which was relied on by the Court in Nicaragua, confirmed the 
following principles: 
• Every state has the duty to refrain from organising or encouraging the 
organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for 
incursion into the territory of another state;176 and 
• Every state has a duty to refrain from instigating, assisting or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organised 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of 
force.177 
Finally, article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility allowed for the conduct of a non-state actor to be attributable to a 
state if they acting at the behest of another state. This provision states that:  
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting 
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state carrying 
out the conduct. 
(d)(iv) How 
The lack of a definition of ‘force’ in the Charter creates ambiguity as to how force is 
prohibited. I submitted in the section above that this initially referred to military 
force and traditional weapons as this is what was available and conceivable at the 
time. 
 






The Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons case stated that article 2(4) does not 
specify the type of weaponry required to constitute a use of force.178 Therefore, this 
prohibition extends to weapons not available at the time of the adoption of the 
Charter such as chemical and biological weapons.179 This interpretation means that 
weapons and methods of force not envisaged at the adoption of the Charter could fall 
within this prohibition, such as cyberweapons and the use of cyberattacks. 
(e) UN Charter interpretation  
The overall aim of international law is to reduce the levels of violence between 
states,180 and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the UN Charter, specifically 
article 2(4), is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. This section 
will refer to various provisions in the UN Charter in order to support my assertion 
that article 2(4) was intended to prohibit interstate conflict, and not specifically 
armed conflict, which would also support the argument that cyberattacks are a use of 
force. 
(e)(i) Preamble 
When turning to the Preamble, there are numerous relevant provisions to support my 
assertion.  The Preamble of the Charter declares that the United Nations is 
determined to: 
Save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and, 
… 
To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, 
… 
To Practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours, and 
To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security. 
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The preamble’s intention is to highlight some of the motives of the founders of the 
UN and to serve as an interpretive guideline for the provisions of the Charter.181 The 
wording ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought about untold sorrow of mankind’ was accepted by all delegates 
and was meant to stress not only that the creation of the Organization is a response to 
the two World Wars, but it also indicated the intention of Member States to suppress 
war.182  
From the above it is evident that the aims of the Charter were to prevent war or 
interstate conflict (the likes of which had been prominent at the time), but to also 
create and maintain conditions where states do not need to engage in conflict. 
To ‘practice tolerance and live in peace with one another as good neighbours’ is 
another provision of the Preamble. Although there has been some debate as to 
whether ‘neighbours’ referred to the narrow geographical sense, or whether it was to 
have a more far reaching meaning,183 I submit that the provision’s inclusion in 
Resolution 2625 supports the latter. I submit the wording in the resolution is directed 
to members of the international community as a whole and calls on states to adhere 
to the Principles of the Charter in order to achieve and maintain international peace 
and security. A narrow interpretation whereby states are only to be good neighbours 
to their immediate neighbour is contrary to the aims of the Charter and of this 
resolution. 
(e)(ii) Article 1 
The first chapter of the Charter contains article 1 and 2, which are the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter, and these are intended to provide a guide for the conduct of 
the UN in a fairly flexible manner.184 These Principles and Purposes are intended to 
supplement the Preamble which expresses the ideas which guided the state parties 
when establishing the UN.185 
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Article 1 of the Charter which addresses the Purposes of the Charter, states that the 
purposes of the UN Charter are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, 
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on principle of equal 
rights and self determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
… 
4. To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends. 
It is a matter of controversy as to whether the Purposes contained in article 1 are 
intended to be legally binding. However, certain commentators assert that article 1(1) 
and (2) are considered principles binding under customary international law 
regarding the prohibition of aggression, the prohibition of other breaches of peace 
and the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.186 
Although article 1 does not indicate how a possible conflict between the different 
purposes might be resolved, some commentators assert that it can only be achieved 
by giving priority to the lasting preservation of peace, which has been described as 
‘the purpose of all purposes’.187 In the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ stated that ‘the 
primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the 
fulfilment of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic 
condition’.188 This supports my interpretation that article 2(4) cannot narrowly be 
interpreted to prohibit only armed attacks because the main aim of the Charter is to 
preserve international peace. Such a narrow interpretation which allows states to 
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engage in other forms of conflicts such as cyberwarfare is contrary to the aims of the 
Charter. 
The term ‘international peace and security’ is used frequently throughout the Charter. 
The Preamble and article 1(1), (2) and (3) indicate that the concept of peace consists 
of more than the absence of war.189 According to some commentators, these 
provisions refer to an evolutionary development in the state of international relations 
which is meant to lead to the reduction of these issues likely to cause war.190 If these 
provisions are intended to reduce issues likely to cause war, then I submit that this 
would include cyberattacks being included in the prohibition, because excluding 
them and permitting their use may escalate to a conventional war, which would be 
contrary to the aims of the Charter. 
Article 1(1) refers to the maintenance of international peace and security as the 
overarching purpose of the UN, whereas the suppression of aggression is only 
referred to as one objective to be achieved through measures of collective security.191 
From this, it becomes evident that international peace and security cannot only be 
endangered by acts of aggression, but also by any other threat to the peace. 
Additionally, it means that the suppression of aggression as an objective of the UN is 
subordinate to the maintenance of international peace and security.192 Again, this 
supports the interpretation that article 2(4) is intended to prohibit interstate conflict in 
numerous ways including cyberattacks, it is not only intended to prohibit military 
conflict.  
(e)(iii) Article 2 
Article 2 of the Charter requires Members to pursue the purpose of article 1 and to 
act in accordance with the principles that will be discussed below.  
Article 2 of the Charter states that: 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purpose stated in article 1, 
shall act in accordance with the following (relevant) Principles: 
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1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its Members; 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits 
resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter; and 
3. All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not 
endangered. 
According to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the San Francisco Conference, 
the Principles contained in article 2 of the Charter indicate the raison d’etre of the 
Organization.193 These Principles express the basic rules to be followed in order to 
achieve the purposes of article 1 and the intentions of the Preamble.194 Article 2 
requires Members to act in pursuit of the Purposes contained in article 1. According 
to some commentators, following the Principles in a schematic way is not sufficient. 
Rather, the Principles must be observed in pursuit of, or with the goal of achieving 
the Purposes of article 1.195 From this it is evident that there are no specific actions 
states must take to achieve the purposes of article 1. Instead, this requires states’ 
general behaviour to be in pursuant to the goals in article 1. I submit that permitting 
the use of cyberattacks would be contrary to the principles of the Charter. 
(e)(iv) Preliminary conclusions 
The overarching aim of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and 
security, which is why this has been described as the ‘purpose of all purposes’. 
Although there is support for ‘force’ in article 2(4) referring to military force, I 
submit that is too limited an interpretation and should include methods of force not 
expressly rejected in the negotiating process. For the purpose of this dissertation, I 
submit that the correct interpretation of article 2(4) should prohibit the use of 
cyberattacks. Having looked at the history building up to the drafting of the 
provision, I have showed that delegates had opportunities to limit the meaning of the 
 







provision, but instead opted for the current articulation which is broader so as to not 
limit the scope of the provision and to avoid any possible ‘loopholes’. 
I submit that a narrow interpretation of this provision which excludes the use of 
cyberattacks from its scope would be contrary to the aims and Purposes of the 
Charter, which, according to article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, would lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. This is 
because a narrow interpretation of article 2(4) which excludes cyberattacks would 
promote the use of cyberattacks between states and could escalate to an international 
armed conflict, which is one of the things the Charter aims to prevent. This outcome 
would directly contradict the main purpose of the Charter which is to maintain 
international peace and security, and not to prevent armed conflict specifically. When 
you factor the previous chapter where I concluded that cyberweapons were weapons, 
it would be absurd to conclude that states are permitted to use cyberattacks against 
one another when article 2(4) prohibits them from using other kinds of weapons 
against each other. 
The potential for cyberattacks to destabilize international peace and security was 
echoed by a UN-convened panel of governmental experts who noted that ‘existing 
and potential threats in the sphere of information security are among the most serious 
challenges of the twenty first century… Their effects carry significant risk for public 
safety, the security of nations and the stability of the globally linked international 
community as a whole.’196 
By continuing to employ cyberattacks against one another, states are not only acting 
against the aims the UN is seeking to achieve, but they are directly contravening their 
obligations under article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
To borrow reasoning from the Prevention of Genocide case:197 
It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so 
far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom 
they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts 
through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control 
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that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international 
law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the 
prohibition of the commission of genocide.198 
I submit that the same rationale can be transposed to states in the UN who undertake 
to achieve and maintain international peace and security. I submit that it would be 
paradoxical for states to commit to the pursuit of ‘the purpose of all purposes’ which 
is maintaining international peace and security, while still being permitted to conduct 
cyberattacks against other states.  
SECTION B: ECONOMIC FORCE 
During the drafting of article 2(4), one of the forms of force which was expressly 
excluded from falling under article 2(4) was economic force. As one of the targets of 
a cyberattack could be a state’s financial system, it is therefore imperative to 
ascertain what economic force entails and whether a cyberattack which targets a 
state’s financial infrastructure falls within this exclusion. 
Economic force is a difficult term to define with precision, but it has been used to 
describe conduct ranging from belligerent blockades and the strategic bombing of 
factory infrastructure;199 to decentralised economic countermeasures during 
peacetime such as trade embargoes; boycotts by citizens of one state against the 
products of another state; to collective sanctions imposed by the UN Security 
Council.200  
Economic force is not a new form of force and can be traced back to the 
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431-404 BC) where the Athenians 
imposed trade sanctions on Megara, and this was considered an act of war by the 
Spartans.201 Economic force continued to feature in conflict between nations and, in 
the 17th century, Grotius dealt extensively with the law regulating the classical 
methods of economic force such as naval blockades and contraband.202 The 
numerous blockades, sieges and restrictions of trade throughout history attest to the 
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fact that economic force is a supplement, if not an alternative to military 
engagement.203 
Economic force can broadly fall within two categories which will be discussed 
below: economic force during armed conflict and economic force during peacetime.  
(a) Economic force during armed conflict 
(a)(i) Economic force using armed force  
The clearest example of economic force during an armed conflict is a naval 
blockade, and this refers to not only the blockade, but to the visit and search of 
vessels, their subsequent capture, and the interception of contraband.204 
A naval blockade of enemy ports intends to cut off all maritime communication and 
in particular, all maritime trade between the target state and the rest of the world with 
the intention of putting a strain on a state’s resources.205 Notable blockades occurred 
during the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil Wars and the Two World Wars.206 
‘Visit and Searches’ also operate as a more specific means of economic force than a 
general blockade, and refers to the capture and condemnation as prize of enemy 
merchant ships and their cargo, but can also lead to the capture of neutral merchant 
vessels or the confiscation of their cargo if these are carrying cargo for an enemy 
state.207 A notable example occurred during the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo, 
where NATO maintained that it could exercise ‘visit and searches’ in order to restrict 
the flow of strategic commodities into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.208  
‘Contraband’ refers to cargo aboard neutral merchant vessels bound for territory 
controlled by the enemy and susceptible for use in armed conflict.209 While private 
merchants from neutral states may not be prohibited by belligerents from trading 
with an enemy material or war-related items, they risk having their ships or cargo 
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Although this section has focussed on naval blockades to illustrate examples of 
forceful methods of economic force, it is of course possible to implement blockades 
by the use of land and air forces.211 An example is the blockade of Berlin from 1948 
to 1949. 
(a)(ii) Economic force not involving armed force 
Beyond blockades, there are general measures of economic force taken during an 
armed conflict which are not linked to a military operation or may not require the use 
of armed force at all.212 These forms of economic force take the form of domestic 
legislation or administrative acts.213 These measures will primarily be directed at 
persons, property and conduct within the jurisdiction of the legislating state, and will 
typically prohibit any trading with the enemy.214 However, these measures can go 
beyond that and may also freeze all enemy funds and assets in the legislating state, 
and that state may also impose specific trade restrictions such as the prohibition of 
exports or the reduction of export quotas.215 Laws prohibiting trade with the enemy 
were prominent during the Two World Wars, with the UK’s Trading with the Enemy 
Acts of 1914 and 1939 offering a good example of this connection.216 These acts 
primarily provided for the application of a territorial test, according to which people 
within the UK jurisdiction were forbidden to trade with anyone residing ‘beyond the 
line of war’.217 This prohibition applied irrespective of nationality, as individuals and 
companies in enemy territory were deemed to be enemy aliens by the operation of 
the law.218 
Other administrative or legislative measures to compliment military force include the 
freezing of enemy assets in the territory of the acting state.219 Finally, imposing 
embargoes, which refer to the prohibition of imports or exports to an enemy state is 
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also a common method of economic force even if it is not supported by a 
blockade.220 
(b)  Economic Force in peacetime 
The use of economic force is not limited to times of armed conflict but can also be 
relied on during times of peace. This is because there are certain measures taken 
during times of peace that may resemble traditional economic force to such an extent 
that it is fair to say that economic force – in the form of economic coercion – is not 
merely limited to being supplementary to armed conflict, but can be an alternative to 
armed conflict.221 This development is in part a result of the creation of the UN 
Charter in two separate but interconnected ways. 
The first is the prohibition of the use of force contained in article 2(4) of the Charter, 
which has put a strain on the traditional distinction between wartime and 
peacetime.222 States are reluctant to take action which may violate this provision, and 
when they do wish to apply pressure on other states, they are likely to employ 
measures which do not amount to armed force.223 
The second way in which the UN Charter impacted economic force is that it 
institutionalized it and attempted to incorporate it within the framework of Chapter 
VII.224 Under article 41, the Security Council may order the imposition of measures 
including the ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication.   
Under article 42, the Security Council may take action ‘by air, sea, or land forces’, 
including ‘demonstrations and blockade’ in order to maintain international peace and 
security. Both these types of measures allude to the use of economic force.  
The rest of this section will be divided into institutionalized economic force which is 
authorised by the Security Council and decentralized economic force which refers to 
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(b)(i) Institutionalized Economic Force 
Institutionalized economic force takes the form of collective measures imposed or 
authorised by the Security Council.225 Article 41 of the Charter allows for the 
Security Council to use non-armed forms of force in order to maintain international 
peace and security. Acting under this provision, the Security Council has imposed 
embargoes on states on numerous occasions, some of which have been so 
comprehensive that they applied to all trade between the target state and all other 
states.226 
The Security Council has also resorted to financial sanctions on numerous occasions. 
Financial sanctions require states to freeze all financial assets of the target that are 
located within its jurisdiction, and these may be imposed by a state, personally 
against the leaders of a state, individuals or other entities that constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.227 
The Security Council has even relied on article 42 to authorise the use of force in 
order to enforce and imposed a trade embargo.228 In such circumstances where the 
Security Council is authorising force in order to enforce a trade embargo, it is 
effectively imposing a blockade.229 
(b)(ii) Decentralized Economic Force 
Decentralized peacetime measures which may qualify as economic force are those 
measures taken unilaterally by states that target the economy of another state with the 
intention of applying pressure to bring about change in the conduct of the target 
state.230 This includes the economic embargoes or boycotts, the reduction or 
withdrawal of economic aid, restrictions in trade such as the reduction in quotas, and 
the freezing of the state’s financial assets.231 
The legality of these measures will depend on the circumstances and on the particular 













measures of retorsion, if they are lawful but unfriendly;232 b) as countermeasures, if 
they are in breach of international obligations, but their wrongfulness is precluded 
because it was taken in response to a particular breach; or c) as breaches of 
international obligations, engaging the international responsibility of the state 
resorting to them.233 
The ICJ in Nicaragua found that a “state is not bound to continue particular trade 
relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or 
other specific legal obligation.”234 Therefore, in the absence of a legal obligation to 
engage in trade with another state, a general trade embargo may be a lawful measure. 
Numerous examples of decentralized measures of economic force can be referred to 
and these measures are usually justified by the acting states as being a response to a 
perceived violation on the part of the target state.235 Examples are the Arab oil 
boycott in the 1970s against states supporting Israel,236 the measures against the 
USSR for its intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s,237 as well as the US response 
to the Iranian violation of diplomatic law in the hostage crisis.238 
(c)  Cyberattack and economic damage: conclusions 
The aim of this section was to ascertain whether cyberattacks targeting the economy 
or financial system of a state fall within the concept of economic force. I submit that 
cyberattacks causing economic harm do not fall within the concept of economic 
force as outlined above, and therefore can constitute a use of force. I base this 
assertion on the material differences between the two which I will outline below. 
The first difference between cyberattacks and economic force such as embargoes is 
that economic force is external and gradual while cyberattacks are internal and 
swift.239 The oil embargo of 1973 lasted for almost six months and the stock market 
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probably a decisive factor, it was not the only factor for the crash.241 Cyberattacks 
could disable targets such as financial markets in a way that neither kinetic force, nor 
political or economic sanctions could.242 
Secondly, cyberattacks are more likely to last for a short period of time and produce 
immediate direct results such as the destruction of data, while economic force takes 
longer and its consequences would be indirect.243 
Thirdly, economic force is based on the external influencing of market forces.244 A 
cyberattack on the other hand involves intrusive actions in the target state’s sphere 
such as the hacking of its systems and introduces a sovereignty-encroaching element 
that influences the market internally.245  
Fourthly, a cyberattack can also be more accurately targeted, with the potential to 
cause damage to both intangible and tangible property.246 
Finally, cyberattacks causing economic harm resemble more of an attack by 
conventional weapons than any of the forms of economic force mentioned above.247 
Cyberattacks are also generally intrusive, and also contravene the principle of non-
intervention. Economic force still appears to respect the territorial sovereignty of 
states and fails to cross the threshold of violating the principle of non-intervention.  
If on one end of the spectrum there is economic force, and on the other end there are 
attacks by traditional weapons on physical infrastructure causing economic harm 
(such as the bombing of the stock exchange for example), then I submit that 
cyberattacks do not resemble economic force at all and would fall closer on the 
spectrum to a conventional attack. Therefore, I submit that cyberattacks causing 
economic damage do not fall within the excluded concept of economic force and are 














SECTION C: CYBERATTACKS AS A USE OF FORCE 
As has been stated numerous times before, not all cyberattacks have violent 
consequences or rise to the threshold of an armed attack. I submit that the non-
violent cyberattacks and those falling below the threshold of an armed attack are also 
capable of contravening article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It is also important to 
establish whether a cyberattack is a ‘most grave’ use of force, a ‘less grave’ use of 
force or neither as this will determine what responses the victim state may legally 
pursue. 
The submission that non-violent cyberattacks and those falling below the threshold 
of an armed attack are capable of contravening article 2(4) is also supported by the 
Tallinn Manual which outlined numerous factors that states could consider when 
making a use of force assessment. The most important conclusion that can be drawn 
from the Tallinn Manual is that these cyberattacks can be uses of force, even though 
much would depend on the surrounding circumstances. This section will rely on the 
Tallinn Manual, where the group of experts attempted to address the issue of non-
violent cyberattacks, or cyberattacks which fall below the threshold of an armed 
attack. 
The experts identified numerous factors involved in a cyberattack to be considered 
by victim states when they make a use of force assessment. Their goal was to 
identify cyberattacks that were similar to other attacks which the international 
community would describe as a use of force.248 Their approach seems to suggest that 
states would place significant weight on the following factors when deciding whether 
a cyberattack is a use of force. According to the international group of experts, states 
would look at the following factors: 
(a) Severity: Subject to a de minimus rule, consequences involving physical harm 
to individuals or property will, in and of themselves, qualify as a use of force. 
Those causing mere inconvenience will never do so.249 Between these two 
extremes, the more consequences that a cyberattack causes on critical 
national interests, the more they will be considered as a use of force.250 
 







Additionally, the scope, duration, and density of the consequences will also 
have a bearing on the appraisal of their severity.251 According to the experts, 
severity is self evident and the most important factor in this analysis. 
(b) Immediacy: The sooner consequences manifest, the less opportunity states 
have to seek peaceful accommodation of a dispute or to forestall their 
harmful effects.252 States are more concerned about immediate consequences 
than they are about those that are delayed or that will develop slowly over 
time.253 
(c) Directness: The greater the attenuation between the initial act and its 
consequences, the less likely states will be to find an actor to be in violation 
of the prohibition of the use of force.254 Directness differs from the 
immediacy factor in that immediacy focusses on the temporal aspects of the 
consequences, while directness examines the chain of causation.255 
Cyberattacks where the cause and effects are clearly linked are more likely to 
be considered as uses of force. 
(d) Invasiveness: This refers to the degree to which the cyberattack intrudes on 
the target states or its cyber systems contrary to the interests of the state.256 
The general rule is that the more secure a targeted cyber system is, the greater 
the concern as to its penetration.257 For example, penetrating a military 
system is more invasive than penetrating civilian systems. 
(e) Measurability of effects: This factor stems from the willingness of states to 
characterise actions as a use of force when the consequences are apparent.258 
Traditionally, armed forces carried out operations that qualified as a use of 
force and their effects were measurable (such as battle damage assessments), 
while with cyberattacks, consequences may be less evident. Therefore, the 
more identifiable and quantifiable a set of consequences of a cyberattack are, 
 












the easier it will be to determine whether a state has reached the level of a use 
of force.259  
(f) Military character: if there is a link between a cyberattack and a military 
operation, this would increase the likelihood of a characterisation of a use of 
force.260 According to the experts, this is supported by the Charter which is 
particularly concerned with military actions.261 
(g) State involvement: The extent to which a state is involved in a cyberattack 
ranges from conducting it itself through armed forces to those in which its 
involvement is peripheral.262 The clearer the nexus is between a state and the 
cyberattacks, the more likely they are to be considered to be uses of force. 
(h) Presumptive legality: Because international law is generally prohibitive in 
nature, acts which are not expressly forbidden are generally permitted if there 
is not an accepted customary law prohibition.263 According to the experts, 
international law does not prohibit propaganda, psychological operations, 
espionage, or mere economic pressure per se, therefore acts falling into these 
categories are presumably legal and are less likely to be considered to be uses 
of force by states.264 
According to the Tallinn Manual, these factors are not exhaustive and one would also 
need to look at the circumstances in which a cyberattack takes place in order to 
determine whether it is a use of force.265 Additionally, states may look to other 
factors such as the prevailing political environment, whether the cyberattack is a sign 
of future military force, the identity of the attacker, any records of cyberattacks by 
the attacker, and the nature of the target – such as critical infrastructure - in making a 
use of force assessment.266 These factors support my submission that non-violent 
cyberattack or those that do not rise to the threshold of an armed attack are capable 















SECTION D: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
An attack directed against the so-called ‘critical infrastructures’ seems to be the most 
conceivable non-violent cyberattack, or cyberattack which does not rise to an armed 
attack. As stated in chapter two, the Stuxnet worm was specifically meant to target 
critical infrastructures and systems which controlled pipelines, electric plants, 
nuclear facilities and other large industrial installations. The protection of critical 
infrastructures has always been a key concern for states in their discussion on 
cybersecurity.267 The most recent example of this articulation was in UNGA 
Resolution 73/266,268 where the sixth preambular paragraph states the following: 
Expressing concern that these technologies and means can potentially be used 
for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining 
international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of 
the infrastructure of States, to the detriment of their security in both civil and 
military fields. 
The advantage of this concept is that it is widely used by states and multilateral 
organisations in the discussion of cybersecurity and seems to address their key 
concerns.269 Additionally, while there is some variation on the interpretation of the 
term, there is sufficient overlap and consistency to provide a general understanding 
of the meaning of the term. Below, I will discuss various definitions of ‘critical 
infrastructures’ which have been adopted by both states and international 
organizations in order to better understand the concept. 
(a) UN General Assembly:  
Critical infrastructure include ‘those used for, inter alia, the generation, 
transmission and distribution of energy, air and maritime transport, banking 
and financial services, e-commerce, water supply, food distribution and 
public health – and the critical information infrastructures that increasingly 
interconnect and affect their operations.’270 
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(b) United States:  
‘Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential 
to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, 
but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, 
transportation, water systems and emergency services, both government and 
private.’271  
‘The term ‘critical infrastructure’ means systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.’272  
‘The critical infrastructure sectors consist of agriculture and food, water, 
public health, emergency services, government, the defence industrial base, 
information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and 
finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and posting and shipping.’273  
(c) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:  
“‘Critical structures’ – public facilities, systems and institutions attacks on 
which may cause consequences directly affecting national security, including 
that of the individual, society and state.”274  
(d) European Union:  
‘Critical infrastructure include those physical resources, services, and 
information technology facilities, network and infrastructure assets which, if 
disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, 
security or economic well-being of Citizens or the effective functioning of 
governments.’275   
‘Critical Information Infrastructure (CII): ICT systems that are critical 
infrastructures for themselves or that are essential for the operation of critical 
infrastructures (telecommunications, computers/software, internet, satellites, 
etc).’276  
 










(e) Australia:  
‘Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, 
information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, 
degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would adversely 
impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s 
ability to ensure national security.’277  
Critical infrastructures include: ‘banking and finance, communications, 
emergency services, energy, food chain, health (private), water service, mass 
gatherings, and transport (aviation, maritime surface).’278  
This section identified critical infrastructures as the potential targets of cyberattacks 
which were either non-violent or fell below the threshold of an armed attack. In the 
UNGA Resolution above, states have already expressed their concern that 
cyberattacks could be aimed at their critical infrastructure. Therefore, this section 
tried to identify what ‘critical infrastructure’ entailed as states have been shown (both 
prior to the Second World War, to more recently, with the US’ retaliation on Iran 
which was curated to stay ‘well below the threshold of war’) to be eager to exploit 
legal ambiguities in order to attack states. Developing an understanding of critical 
infrastructures is therefore mandatory as an attack on them would form a crucial part 
in the victim state’s use of force assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter submitted the argument that ‘force’ in article 2(4) could be interpreted 
to prohibit the use of cyberattacks. I submit that ‘force’ was not intended to have a 
singular meaning. To support this argument, I attempted to show that the ultimate 
aim of the drafters was to prevent interstate conflict, and that the term ‘force’ 
originated due to the need to prevent states from exploiting linguistic loopholes, 
something that was prevalent before the Second World War. The drafters of the 
Charter excluded specific types of force, but this also implies that they left the door 
open for other types of force to fall within this provision. Had they wanted to limit 
the concept of force to armed force, they could have done so as the term is present in 








In addition to looking at the history surrounding the drafting of article 2(4), this 
section looked at various provisions in the UN Charter to support the argument that 
the use of cyberattacks contravenes this provision. After investigating the overall 
aims of the UN Charter, it would lead to ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ 
conclusions if article 2(4) was interpreted narrowly to exclude the use of 
cyberattacks. Permitting cyberattacks would lead to cyberwar which could escalate to 
an armed conflict, contradicting the most important Purpose of the Charter, which is 
to maintain international peace and security. 
The ICJ has alluded to the fact that generic terms are capable of evolving over time. 
A secondary - yet interlinked - argument that I have submitted is that ‘force’ is one 
such term that is capable of evolving over time. This chapter provided numerous 
examples of how the concept of force has changed since the UN Charter was first 
adopted to support this assertion.  
Finally, this section discussed critical infrastructure and factors that states would 
consider when making use of force assessments for cyberattacks which fell below the 
threshold of an armed attack. I identified critical infrastructure as the likely targets of 
non-violent cyberattacks or those curated to fall below an armed attack. 
It is important to correctly categorize cyberattacks as either being armed attacks, 
‘less grave’ uses of force or as neither, because this will dictate what response the 
victim state is legally permitted to pursue. The following chapter will discuss the 
responses available to the victim state of a cyberattack. At the same time, in this 
chapter I will make the third of my overarching arguments, that existing international 
law is insufficient to adequately regulate the use of cyberattacks and that a 











CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES  
This chapter has two aims: the first is to briefly discuss the current responses 
available to a state which is the victim of a cyberattack. The second is to argue that 
these responses are inadequate in dealing with the complex nature of cyberattacks, 
and that a multilateral treaty would be a better option to deal with cyberattacks. 
This chapter will be divided as follows: Section A will briefly discuss the judicial 
and non-judicial responses that a victim state of a cyberattack may pursue. Due to 
international law’s inability to create a response to cyberattacks as a use of force, this 
section will therefore investigate responses for traditional uses of force, and 
investigate whether these responses can be transposed to victim states of 
cyberattacks. 
Section B will submit an argument for the adoption of a multilateral treaty. I submit 
that the existing international responses are inadequate in addressing the unique 
nature of cyberattacks and that a multilateral treaty would be a better alternative to 
maintain international peace and security. To support this argument, I will refer to 
various treaties to identify various issues that would be better resolved by adopting a 
multilateral treaty. 
SECTION A: EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
When a belligerent state commits an unlawful use of force, it commits an 
internationally wrongful act which entitles the victim state to respond in numerous 
ways. This section will investigate the judicial and non-judicial responses available 
to the victim state of a use of force and discuss whether these can be transposed to 
the victim state of a cyberattack. 
(a) Judicial responses 
The first response available to a victim state is to approach the ICJ to seek numerous 
remedies found in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (Draft Articles). States have turned to the ICJ to resolve alleged uses 
of force on a number of cases beginning with the Corfu Channel279 case which was 
 





decided in 1949, to most recently in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo280 case which was decided in 2005. 
The remedies which the victim state of a use of force may invoke are found in 
articles 29-37 of the Draft Articles. These are: the continued duty of performance,281 
cessation and non-repetition,282 and reparations283 which take the form of 
restitution284, compensation285 and satisfaction.286 
Based on the remedies in the Draft Articles, it appears that the remedies available for 
traditional uses of force can be transposed to the victim states of a cyberattack. This 
is because the victim state of a cyberattack would want the same remedies, such as 
the cessation and non-repetition of the cyberattacks along with reparations for the 
damage suffered. 
However, I submit that the judicial option is inadequate for numerous reasons. The 
first relates to the amount of time that it takes to reach a ruling in the ICJ. I submit 
that the ICJ is not responsive enough to keep up with the rapid nature of 
cyberattacks. This is based on the significant amount of time between when the 
alleged use of force occurred and when the ICJ makes its final judgment. In the 
Corfu Channel case, the initial use of force occurred in 1946 and the ICJ issued its 
judgment in 1949. The ICJ ruled on the Nicaragua case in 1986, seven years after 
the alleged use of force. Finally, the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case 
was decided in 2005, seven years after the unlawful use of force. 
A second reason that I submit that the judicial option is inadequate for the victim 
states of cyberattacks is because of the unique and rapid nature of cyberattacks. A 
devastating amount of damage can be done in one day using cyberattacks. In 2009, 
the United States claimed that it suffered over 50,000 cyberattacks per day.287 
Chapter two of this dissertation discussed the devastation that could be caused 
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through the use of cyberattacks, and I submit that 50,000 cyberattacks with the 
intention to cause severe damage on one day could cause irreparable damage. I 
further submit that the damage suffered by the victim state would be multiplied 
exponentially if attacks continued until the ICJ ruled on the matter (or until 
provisional measures are granted). Additionally (and depending on the nature of the 
cyberattacks), I submit that the remedies in the Draft Articles are either not 
responsive enough to deal with cyberattacks (cessation and non-repetition for 
example is not responsive enough in the case of cyberattacks which are rapid, which 
effectively eliminates the need for this remedy as attacks may have ceased by the 
time legal proceedings are instituted) or will not adequately compensate the victim 
state for the damage it has suffered. I submit that a treaty would be proactive in 
trying to prevent cyberattacks as opposed to the judicial option which is reactive.  
Thirdly, the ICJ in previous use of force cases has awarded compensation to the 
victim state of a use of force. However, the ICJ has ruled that it would decide on the 
quantum of compensation only after the parties have failed to reach a settlement on 
the compensation to be paid by the responsible state. An example of this is the 
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case where the ICJ ruled that the Uganda 
had violated the prohibition on the use of force and that the Democratic Republic of 
Congo was entitled to reparations.288 But the ICJ would only decide on the quantum 
of the compensation should both parties not be able to reach a settlement on the 
amount.289 
Furthermore, the ICJ has not always been able to enforce their judgments for 
compensation and the Nicaragua case is the most famous example of this. Here, the 
ICJ ruled that the US was to pay compensation amounting to $12 billion to 
Nicaragua.290 However, after numerous unsuccessful attempts to enforce the 
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judgment, Nicaragua eventually gave up on its attempts to obtain compensation from 
the US.291 
(b)  Non-judicial responses 
The Draft Articles also contain the non-judicial responses that a victim state of a use 
of force may pursue. These responses can be found in articles 20-25 of the Draft 
Article and are: consent,292 self defence,293 countermeasures,294 force majeure,295 
distress296 and necessity.297 As self defence was discussed in chapter three, the only 
response available to a use of force falling below the threshold of an armed attack is 
the use of countermeasures. 
Countermeasures are invoked in circumstances where one state commits a wrongful 
act against another state and the victim state resorts to non-forcible countermeasures 
in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury sustained.298 
Essentially, they are the mechanism in which international law allows parties to carry 
out self help.299 In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ accepted that 
countermeasures might justify otherwise unlawful conduct which was taken in 
response to a previous internationally wrongful act of another state and directed 
against the state which committed the wrongful act.300  
The commentary to the Draft Articles (in Chapter II Part Three) outlines numerous 
limitations (based on articles 49-53) in the use of countermeasures in order to 
safeguard against abuse.  
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These are:  
1. They must be directed at the state which has committed the wrongful act and 
not a third state;301  
2. They are to be non-forcible measures;302  
3. Since countermeasures are intended to be instrumental – seeking the 
cessation of an international wrong and obtaining reparations for injury 
suffered – they are temporary in character and must be, as far as possible, 
reversible in their effects in terms of future legal obligations between the two 
states;303  
4. They must be proportionate;304 
5. They must not deviate from certain basic obligations, in particular 
peremptory norms;305 
6. Countermeasures cannot affect any dispute settlement procedure which is in 
force between the two states and applicable to the dispute;306 
7. Countermeasures may not be used to impair diplomatic and consular 
inviolability;307 
8. Countermeasures must be preceded by a demand by the injured state that the 
responsible state comply with its obligations, and this demand must be 
accompanied with an offer to negotiate;308 and 
9. Countermeasures must be suspended if the internationally wrongful act has 
ceased and the dispute is submitted in good faith to a court or tribunal with 
the authority to make a binding decision on the parties.309 
The Tallinn Manual also repeatedly supports my submission that states may rely on 
countermeasures when they are victims of cyberattacks falling below the threshold of 
an armed attack.310 However, I submit that countermeasures are also inadequate for 
numerous reasons. 
 














The first reason that countermeasures are inadequate is because they pose a particular 
danger when it comes to cyberattacks: that this could lay the groundwork for a 
cyberwar between states which could then escalate to a conventional war. In 2019, 
Forbes revealed that governments were becoming more ‘cyber’ and had built so-
called ‘red team’s that carried out offensive cyberattacks ranging from espionage and 
propaganda, to assaults on infrastructure and stolen money or intellectual property.311 
This article also stated that governments were becoming more aggressive with their 
cyber campaigns and were breaking certain unspoken rules of engagement.312 I 
submit that the use of cyberattacks as a countermeasures is likelier to escalate to a 
cyberwar (and potentially a traditional war) than it is to obtain compliance from the 
belligerent state. 
States have already started contemplating using cyberattacks as countermeasures. 
The UK became the first state to announce that it was developing offensive cyber 
capabilities as part of its deterrent strategy.313 In 2018, the UK considered launching 
a cyberattack as a countermeasure, but opted to exercise restraint until rules of 
engagement could be established.314 
The second reason relates to the limitations discussed above in the Draft Articles. 
According to the Draft Articles, countermeasures are intended to bring about the 
cessation of wrongful conduct and must be suspended when the internationally 
wrongful conduct has ceased. This poses problems for the state which is either the 
victim of a singular attack, or composite attacks.  
As countermeasures are intended to bring about the cessation of internationally 
wrongful conduct, it suggests that a victim state may not rely on countermeasures for 
singular or composite cyberattacks as these attacks could not be interpreted as being 
‘ongoing’. I submit that victim states are unlikely to tolerate cyberattacks without 
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responding and may respond with their own cyberattacks, which may escalate to a 
cyberwar and potentially a conventional war. 
Thirdly, evidence of the perpetrator of a cyberattack is often found when the damage 
is done and the act is over. This means that a victim state can only legally employ 
countermeasures against cyberattacks when the identity of the perpetrator is revealed 
and the attacks are still ongoing, along with the other requirements listed above. 
Again, this creates a situation where a victim state is forced to endure cyberattacks 
from another state and is not permitted to legally respond with countermeasures 
because certain conditions are no longer present. I submit that victim states are 
unlikely to tolerate these attacks without responding. 
In conclusion, although the victim state of a cyberattack falling below the threshold 
of an armed attack may legally respond with countermeasures, I submit that 
countermeasures are also inadequate in dealing with cyberattacks. This is because 
there are numerous loopholes that can be exploited by the responsible state whereby 
that state can use a cyberattack against the victim state and the victim state may not 
legally respond with countermeasures. This creates a situation in which victim states 
are forced to endure cyberattacks and may not respond legally. I submit that victim 
states are unlikely to endure such attacks indefinitely but are likely to respond with 
cyberattacks and this could escalate to a cyberwar, which could then conceivably 
escalate to a conventional war.  
SECTION B: MULTILATERAL TREATY 
I submit that the creation of a multilateral treaty is the best option to maintain 
international peace and security. I submit that a treaty is better suited to maintain 
international peace and security than the current options in extant international law 
because it would proactively prevent the use of cyberattacks, it would eliminate 
many of the loopholes surrounding the use of cyberattacks and finally, a treaty can 
address numerous issues that have surrounded cyberattacks, some of which will be 
discussed below. 
Additionally, states can no longer remain apathetic about a multilateral treaty as 
cybersecurity is a problem for the international community as a whole, not just 
interested states. An example of this collective vulnerability was evident in 2017 





computers in over 150 countries resulting in damages of over $4 billion, including 
shutting down the UK’s health services.315 
I submit that a multilateral treaty offers the best prospects of maintaining 
international peace and security, and it would be able to address numerous issues that 
exist surrounding cyberattacks. This section will therefore discuss numerous issues 
that currently exist in international law that would be addressed by a treaty. This 
section will predominantly draw on the most recent multilateral cybersecurity treaty, 
the EU Cybersecurity Act,316 which came into effect on 27 June 2019, but will also 
draw on other treaties as well. 
A multilateral treaty will offer specificity and clarity on the following critical issues 
surrounding cybersecurity: 
(a) Norms 
A multilateral treaty is unlikely to call for a complete ban on state activities on the 
internet as that would be impractical. Instead, such a treaty would likely be a ‘dual-
use’ treaty such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Both of these treaties seek to ban 
the use and even possession of chemical and nuclear weapons, while at the same time 
promoting the legitimate, non-military use of chemical and nuclear weapons.317 
Examples are the six critical norms introduced by the Global Commission on the 
Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) in November 2018.318 These are the norm to avoid 
tampering,319 the norm against commandeering of ICT Devices into botnets,320 the 
norm for states to create a vulnerability equities process,321 the norm to reduce and 
mitigate significant vulnerabilities,322 the norm on basic cyber hygiene as 
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foundational defence,323 and the norm against offensive cyber operations by non-
state actors.324  
(b) Defining critical terms 
Arguably the most important consequence of a multilateral treaty would be reaching 
international consensus on the definition of critical terms. As has been shown in 
previous chapters, international law is still lacking consensus on critical terms such 
as ‘force’, ‘weapon’ and ‘cyberweapon’. A treaty which defines critical terms in 
cybersecurity will ultimately be beneficial for international law and the UN’s 
collective security regime. 
(c) Which organisation is responsible to reach treaty objectives? 
A multilateral treaty would outline which body is tasked with the implementation of 
the treaty to achieve its goals. This clarity is better than the fragmented nature that 
currently exists in international law. The EU Cybersecurity Act, for example, tasks 
ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) with the aim of achieving the 
goals of the treaty.325 
(d) Jurisdiction 
A multilateral treaty would clarify which judicial body is to settle a dispute and what 
conditions need to be satisfied before that tribunal can be approached. The treaty 
could confer jurisdiction on an existing tribunal such as the ICJ, a new judicial body 
could be created which specifically deals with contraventions of the treaty such as 
the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) for example,326327 or the 
treaty could allow disputes to be resolved by the Security Council. Examples of the 
latter are the CWC and NPT which empower the General Assembly and Security 
Council to intervene for grave and severe violations of the respective conventions.328 
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(e) Consequences for breaches 
A multilateral treaty will provide clarity on what punishments will be imposed for a 
breach of the treaty. The treaty will not only clarify the consequences between the 
responsible state and victim state but would also clarify the consequences between 
the responsible state and other parties to the convention. An example of such 
consequences are collective sanctions. 
(f) Measures to be taken at national level 
As the aim of the treaty would be to promote collective security, the Treaty could 
specify what measures states can take at the domestic level to aid in the pursuit of the 
goals of the treaty. These measures could include but are not limited to: the creation 
of domestic laws; creating or supporting enforcement agencies; and, partnerships 
with non-state actors to aid in the pursuit of the goals of the treaty. 
(g) Exchanging knowledge, know-how and best practices 
Just like the EU Cybersecurity Act,329 the proposed treaty could promote the sharing 
of knowledge and practices between states as they seek to maintain peace and 
security in cyberspace. The exchange of information and practices will assist less 
developed states to develop their capacity in order to meet the objectives of the 
treaty. 
(h) Cooperation models on how to address trans-border issues 
‘WannaCry’ showed the trans-border nature of cyberattacks. A treaty will bring 
states together to find ways to co-operate in order to address these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Although international law currently offers recourse for victims of cyberattacks, I 
submit that it is not sufficient to avoid cyberwar, which could possibly escalate to 
traditional war. This is because existing international law is either not reactive 
enough and cannot prevent attacks, it is not responsive enough after one cyberattack 
to prevent a response from the victim state, and there are currently no deterrents 
strong enough to prevent states from using cyberattacks.  
 





In this chapter, I also discussed countermeasures which are the only legal non-
judicial response available for a use of force which falls below the threshold of an 
armed attack. However, the limitations placed on the victim state which seeks to use 
countermeasures means that a belligerent state can exploit loopholes to create 
conditions where it can attack the victim state and that state may not legally be 
permitted to respond with countermeasures. This means that the victim state is 
essentially forced to tolerate attacks against it by the belligerent state. I submit that 
this threatens international peace and security because states are unlikely to tolerate 
these attacks indefinitely and may respond with their own cyberattacks which may 
escalate to cyberwar, which may possibly escalate to a conventional war.  
A multilateral treaty offers the best prospects of maintaining international peace and 
security because it would proactively attempt to prevent the use of cyberattacks. This 
approach would differ from existing responses which are reactive. A treaty offers 
numerous advantages that will lead to the maintenance of international peace and 
security such as defining critical terms, establishing cybersecurity norms which could 
become customary, and encouraging co-operation between states in dealing with 
certain trans-boundary issues. As ‘WannaCry’ showed, cybersecurity is a concern for 
the entire international community and states can no longer remain indifferent to 















CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation set out to make three interrelated arguments. The first was that 
cyberweapons were weapons, the second was that cyberattacks were a use of force, 
and finally, that the adoption of a multilateral treaty offered the best prospects of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
Establishing that cyberweapons were weapons was necessary for various reasons. 
The first is that it lay the foundation for my second argument as it is generally 
accepted that a state which unjustifiably attacks another state with other types of 
weapons commits an unlawful use of force. I wanted to show that it would be absurd 
for the prohibition to prohibit states from attacking each other with one type of 
weapon, but exclude states attacking each other with another type of weapon which 
is capable of causing similar damage. The second is that the use of cyberattacks is no 
longer limited to hacking and stealing sensitive information. Cyberattacks are now 
capable of producing devastating physical damage. When describing the potential 
damage that cyberattacks can cause, former FBI Director Robert Muller said that 
cyberattacks could have the same effect as a well placed bomb. The final, and 
perhaps the most important reason it was important to establish that cyberweapons 
are weapons is because states are in fact using them as weapons. In the second 
chapter I provided numerous examples of states using cyberweapons alongside, or as 
an alternative to traditional weapons to show that states have in fact begun to 
militarize cyberspace. 
The militarization of cyberspace provided a perfect segue to my second argument, 
which was that cyberattacks were a use of force. Supporting this assertion provided 
me with numerous difficulties, the most obvious being that there was no 
internationally accepted definition for what ‘force’ was, both in and out of 
cyberspace. However, there is consensus among some commentators that ‘force’ in 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter initially referred to armed or military force. The 
second challenge that was faced was whether only the ‘violent’ cyberattacks 
constituted a use of force or whether non-violent cyberattacks could also constitute a 
use of force. I believed that both violent and non-violent cyberattacks were capable 





Chapters three and four of this dissertation were split along the same lines that the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case divided the concept of force. Chapter three argued that 
cyberattacks were an armed attack or ‘most grave’ use of force, while chapter four 
argued that cyberattacks could also be a ‘less grave’ use of force. I chose to separate 
the two for multiple reasons. The first is that it is important to determine which 
category a cyberattack falls into as this will determine the response the victim state is 
able to pursue legally. The second is to shed light on what non-violent cyberattacks 
and cyberattacks which do not rise to the threshold of an armed attack would look 
like. 
Chapter three argued that cyberattacks could be an armed attack. This submission 
was supported by the Tallinn Manual where international law experts agreed that 
cyberattacks could be an armed attack if the scale and effects of the cyberattack 
reach the threshold of an armed attack. 
Chapter four might initially seem unnecessary because if cyberattacks can be a ‘most 
grave’ use of force then they automatically can be a ‘less grave’ use of force. I 
submit that this investigation was necessary because states are already curating their 
attacks to fall below the threshold of an armed attack in order to exploit the 
ambiguity which surrounds article 2(4) of the Charter. In order to successfully argue 
that the prohibition in article 2(4) extended to cyberattacks, it was important to 
establish what behaviour the drafters of the UN Charter were aiming to prohibit 
when the provision was drafted and adopted. 
I relied on article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
requires you to look at the circumstances and context in which a treaty was drafted in 
order to confirm the meaning of a provision. An investigation into the context in 
which the provision was drafted reveals that article 2(4) was the culmination of 
numerous unsuccessful attempts by states to prevent interstate conflict. When 
referring to the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, they reveal that ‘force’ was 
used to avoid states exploiting loopholes in order to engage in conflict. The travaux 
preparatoires also reveal that certain types of force were excluded from the 
conception of ‘force’ in article 2(4) of the Charter, implying that other types of force 
were capable of falling within this prohibition. This supports my submission that the 





types of force. Had the drafters intended the prohibition to be limited to armed force, 
they could have simply used the term as it is present in other parts of the UN Charter. 
Other provisions within the Charter support the interpretation that the UN Charter is 
primarily concerned with avoiding war and maintaining international peace and 
security. I submit that an interpretation where the use of cyberattacks is excluded 
from the prohibition in article 2(4) would lead to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable. 
The Tallinn Manual also supports the submission that cyberattacks can be ‘less 
grave’ uses of force. Although much would depend on the circumstances of the 
particular attack, it does support the notion that cyberattacks can be ‘less grave’ uses 
of force. The Tallinn Manual goes on to provide a list of non-exhaustive factors that 
victim states could consider when making their use of force assessments.  
Finally, chapter five made the argument that existing international law is unable to 
adequately regulate cyberattacks and that a multilateral treaty is required as it would 
be better equipped to maintain international peace and security. To support this 
argument, I discussed how international law is reactive, not responsive enough, and 
how a belligerent state could exploit loopholes in order to attack states without that 
state being able to legally respond. I submit that victim states are unlikely to endure 
those cyberattacks indefinitely and could respond with their own cyberattacks, which 
may then escalate to a cyberwar and then a traditional war. I submit that a 
multilateral treaty offers the best prospects of maintaining international peace and 
security as it would proactively attempt to prevent the use of cyberattacks and also 
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